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  1I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Why is it that a growing number of studies are devoted to examining individual 
environmental preferences, proposing that individuals’ environmental morale or attitudes 
could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated 
with public goods (see, for example Frey and Stutzer, 2006)?  One motivation for such a 
suggestion is that control and deterrence models predict a far lower level of compliance 
than that actually observed. In many countries, the level of government control is too low 
to explain the high degree of environmental compliance.  
However, there are few studies exploring empirically whether such pro-
environmental attitudes exert a positive effect on either environmental behavior or 
involvement in environmental organizations. The presence of such norms or 
environmental motivation influencing the willingness to protect the environment is 
especially useful in situations where it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange a regulatory 
enforcement regime. A desirable and positive side effect of voluntary compliance is that 
it lowers the cost of government operations aimed at ensuring public good provision 
(Slemrod 2002).   
We focus on the individuals’ participation in environmental organizations because 
it is a cooperative behavior that can improve social capital, especially the network 
component
1. Recent studies in the area of ecological economics have shown that social 
capital indeed influences transaction costs and can also have some bearing on the 
effectiveness of public environmental policies (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). 
                                                      
1 See Grootaert and van Bastalaer (2002, p.41-66) 
 
  2These results suggest that “environmental conflicts can be resolved by making collective 
choices that are implemented by establishing, changing or reaffirming governance 
institutions” (Paavola and Adger, 2005, p. 364). The adaptive capability of societies is 
strongly linked to their ability to act collectively (Adger, 2003), thus the existence of 
social capital is important when dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the 
threat of climate change, or for coping with the impact of environmental disasters, such 
as droughts or floods. Katz (2000) showed that social capital is related to the ability to 
address several market failures regarding common property natural resources.  
The strength of this paper lies in exploring the impact of environmental 
motivation on environmental behavior. We focus on individuals’ voluntary engagement 
in environmental organizations and test its impact with the use of both a large micro data 
set covering 32 European countries and a macro data set that also works with a large set 
of 52 countries. Such breadth and depth of data allows exploration of the different 
channels through which individuals express their environmental motivation via pro-
environmental attitudes, and we capitalize on this opportunity by exploring two variables 
that measure voluntary environmental participation (i.e. membership and voluntary 
work).  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 of the paper first discusses the 
theoretical background and proposes a model of volunteering. Section 3 introduces the 
data set and the key variables.  The empirical findings are presented in Section 4 and 





  3II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
What is the meaning of ‘pro-environmental behavior’? Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) 
define it as actions taken by an individual in consciously seeking to minimize the 
negative impact of human activities on the environment and Jensen (2002) refers to those 
personal actions that are directly related to environmental improvements. Some daily 
activities, such as minimizing resource and energy consumption, reducing and recycling 
waste, or using public transport are private actions which contribute to the preservation of 
nature.   
  In the same way, participation in environmental organizations can be seen as a 
kind of pro-environmental behavior and is highly relevant in ensuring the efficacy of 
environmental policies which require behavioral changes. As Handy (2001, p.648) 
pointed out, “much of the initial impetus towards change for protecting environmental 
quality came from concerned individuals who have often come together and formed 
voluntary non-profit associations to collectively address environmental concerns. Their 
persistent lobbying and advocating for environmental protection has changed public 
sentiment, thereby convincing government and businesses to pay attention to their 
demands. (…) Nevertheless, many environmental nonprofit organisations continue to 
play an important role in advocating a better environmental quality”. 
 C ivil engagement in voluntary organizations is gaining increased attention from 
researchers; nonetheless the causes of environmental participation are still relatively 
unknown.  The benefit of participation in voluntary activities is the creation of social 
output that would per se require paid resources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) 
  4showed that the creation of active pro-environmental groups was significant for solving 
certain local environmental problems
2. Our study will not only explore the gender, age 
and parental effect, but will also show who is likely to participate and whose priorities 
and values are best promoted by voluntary work in environmental organizations. 
However, to date only a few studies have analyzed the factors impacting on the 
participation in environmental organizations (Mohai, 1992; Thompson and Barton, 1994; 
Martinez and McMullin, 2004). The advantage of focusing on direct participation in 
environmental organizations is that individuals’ behavior can be measured.  Moreover, it 
builds a bridge between the social capital literature that focuses on volunteering and the 
environmental literature on pro-environmental preferences.  
  The relevance of looking beyond the neoclassical approach in understanding 
seemingly non-rational behavior is demonstrated in the tax compliance literature and the 
analyses of tax paying behavior. In seeking to explain the reasons why citizens comply 
with tax regulations given that the probability of being audited is extremely low, it is 
clear that deterrence mechanisms alone cannot explain the level of observed compliance 
in this regard (Torgler 2007). Similarly, the level of formal deterrence is too low to 
explain why, for example, people do not litter more often. Invoking the power of social 
norms helps to resolve such a puzzle, but further empirical evidence is required to 
determine whether environmental attitudes affect environmental actions. We note that 
previous literature has shown how values and attitudes can affect individual behavior in 
more general sense (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Lewis, 1982).  Thus, it is useful to explore 
whether the decision to participate in environmental organizations is driven by a set of 
                                                      
2 Those authors analyzed some environmental organizations in rural communities. They found an evolution 
from reactive-dependence groups (static and created exclusively in reaction to a threat or a crisis), towards 
awareness-interdependence groups (more dynamic and interactive).  
  5attitudes and norms. Our theoretical model is strongly influenced by previous studies on 
altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and moral motivation
3 in a public good environment (Brekke 
et al. 2003).  
  When considered from an economic perspective, environmental participation 
“exemplifies an individual’s voluntary effort to provide an environmental public good” 
(Clark et al. 2003, p. 238). An economic analysis also prompts the question: why do 
people take actions (incurring private costs) that result in collective benefits? While the 
traditional theoretical models predict a free-rider effect in the private provision of public 
goods, in practice we find clear evidence to the contrary (Andreoni, 1988; Piliavin and 
Charng, 1990). Andreoni (1990, p. 465) developed an important model of impure 
altruism as a means of understanding donations to public goods. He assumes an economy 
with only one private good and one public good. The individual utility donation function 
depends on the consumption of a private good (xi), the total amount of a public good (G), 
and the individual’s gift to the public good (gi). Thus, Ui = U(xi, G, gi). This allows the 
author to differentiate two cases, namely a purely altruistic situation U(xi, Gi) when the 
individual cares nothing for the private gift, and U(xi, gi) when the individual is motivated 
to give only by a “warm-glow” outcome (purely egoistic). The cases in between are 
defined as an impurely altruistic behavior. However, he acknowledges that there are 
important alternative approaches to such an impure altruism model, namely moral or 
                                                      
 
3 The literature has identified a “free-ride” effect, in order to explain why people do not participate 
actively in voluntary organizations. Thus, if an individual perceives that he/she can benefit from any 
successful outcome of collective action, whether or not they contributed to achieve it, then he/she can 
decide not to contribute actively at all. According to Lubell et al. (2006, p. 150), when collective action is 
analyzed, is necessary to “incorporate the logic of free riding by acknowledging that the contribution of a 
single individual only raises the probability of successfully providing a public good by small amount. From 
this perspective, how individuals perceive their own personal influence on collective outcomes is the 
critical value”. So, the free-rider effect is a significant and additional argument that clarifies why people 
can fail to participate actively in environmental groups. 
 
  6group-interested behavior. In line with this suggestion, Brekke et al. (2003) implement 
moral motivation in their model by working with a social welfare function to determine 
the morally ideal effort, where individuals share a utilitarian moral philosophy. For 
simplicity, they assume that the labor supply and the income are exogenously fixed. In a 
next step, individuals maximize their utility in a benefit-cost environment, trading the 
benefits of maintaining a self-image as socially responsible individuals against the costs. 
The desire to improve self-image induces an improved effort towards upholding beliefs 
that are perceived to be morally right.  
  Keeping in mind the theoretical work outlined above, we examine the motivation 
for environmental participation by developing a model of volunteering. We assume that 
individual’s utility function is given by 
 
 ) , , , ( i i i i G l x U U λ =      (1) 
 
where   is individual i’s consumption of private goods,    represents leisure, G is the 
public good of increasing environmental quality, and 
i x i l
i λ  the utility from participating 
voluntarily in an environmental organization. 
  Voluntary work is time consuming and subject to opportunity costs. Thus,   
represents the hours spent for voluntary work in an environmental organization. 
Individuals’ consumption can therefore be written as an income constraint, defined by the 
product of the wage rate w and the working hours T -   -    , where T is the time 
constraint (available time):  
i v
i l i v 0 ≥
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The total amount of public good (environmental quality) depends on the public provision 
Gp and private provision  , assuming identical individuals N:  ∑i i g
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is individual i’s production function that depends on the level of voluntary participation 
in an environmental organization and an efficiency parameterα . Since we have identical 
individuals ∑  is equal to  . Therefore, we can write: 
i i g i Ng
 
  G =  + N p G i v α      (5) 
 
The utility from participating in a voluntary environmental organization ( i λ ) has the 
following form: 
  
  8  i λ  =       (6) 
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where  is a factor that measures an individual’s motivation to contribute to the 
environment (    0). It measures what the individual believes to be the morally ideal 
environmental involvement. Thus, participating in voluntary organizations is correlated 
with individuals’ motivation towards contribution and this enhances an individual’s 
utility function (see first term). On the other hand, if the participation in voluntary 
organizations is l-ower than the morally ideal environmental involvement ( ), 
individuals also experience moral or psychic costs (see second term). This induces a 
feeling of guilt and shame.  
i m
i m ≥
< i v i m
  We also assume that the utility function is additively separable in   and  , , , G l x i i
i λ . The utility function thus becomes: 
 
  i i i i G l x U λ + + + =      (7) 
 
Considering (2) to (6) leads to the following utility function: 
 
       (8) 
2 ) (    )   ( ) ( i i i i i p i i i i i v m v m v N G l v l T w U − − + + + + − − = α
 
  9An individual maximizes utility (8) subject to her voluntary involvement in an 
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leads to the following condition for the optimal effort engagement: 
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Eq. (9) suggests that environmental participation will increase with an increase in 
individual’s motivation to contribute. Thus, we can develop the following main 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher environmental 
moral standards leads to a stronger voluntary involvement in 
environmental organizations.  
 
Moreover, Eq. (9) also indicates that an increase in the wage rate changes the allocation 
of time. An increase leads to a decline of voluntary work in environmental organizations. 
However, such a negative effect is reduced with a higher level of efficiency in the 
contribution of the private provision of the public good, α  multiplied by the number of 
individuals in the society. It should be noted that we have implemented a consumer 
model. One may argue that individuals are also volunteering to accumulate human capital 
with the intention of increasing future income through the acquisition of certain types of 
skills and through creating and developing networks that enhance their human capital 
  10(Hackl et al., 2007). This would require the use of an investment model with a dynamic 
structure. However, we believe that our consumer model is useful and appropriate when 
exploring moral values. 
 
III. DATA  
We use two variables that measure involvement in a voluntary environmental 
organization, namely membership and doing unpaid work: 
 
  Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities 
and say which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for: 
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (1=yes, 0 otherwise).  
  
  Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities 
and say which, if any, do you belong: conservation, the environment, ecology, 
animal rights (1=mentioned, 0= not mentioned). 
 
To ensure the robustness of results, we use several dependent variables that can be seen 
as a proxy m, namely the motivation to contribute to the environment. The first two 
variables measure m in the following way: 
 
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
  11I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
Although we are not conducting a contingent valuation study (CV), these two questions 
offer the chance to explore our parameter m. However, the question is not free of 
problems and can be criticized in several ways. The statement is relatively vague: 
“environmental pollution” is not clearly specified, and neither is the level of 
improvement. Similarly, the proportion of income to be spent and the degree of tax 
increase are not clarified. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they 
would hypothetically have to contribute
4. The consequences of taxation are not 
mentioned and no information is provided regarding the extent to which income tax, 
value added tax or other taxes are supposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will bear 
the highest tax burden. Such unspecified questions regarding the payment schemes will 
increase the variance in responses, but on the other hand, may influence the willingness 
to contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001). Nevertheless, despite these possible 
shortcomings, an unspecified statement still helps to measure moral values and to reduce 
strategic behavior via influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods. 
Providing a more concrete scenario could encourage respondents to intentionally indicate 
a false willingness to contribute to ensure that the outcome of the study matches their 
own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goods nor quantitative 
values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question do not have to be 
                                                      
4 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of 
environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 
2005). 
  12thoroughly explained to ensure that respondents understand the proposition and respond 
with the appropriate willingness to sacrifice income and accept an increase in taxes
5.  
  In a next step we will explore a variable that measures environmental attitudes, 
but takes into account the possibility that people may have an incentive to free-ride 
(profit without incurring costs). We would predict that such a variable would lead to 
contradictory results (compared to the previous two variables): 
 
The Government has to reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me 
any money (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables, which are explained in 
the Appendix. Previous research in environmental economics and social norms 
demonstrates the relevance of considering such socio-demographic factors, formal and 
informal education and participation in an environmental organization (see Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007).  We also differentiate between the two regions of 
Europe (i.e. Western and Eastern Europe) to account for effects of the reform process in 
the transition countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European 
countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to large 
social costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing poverty and 
poor institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high transaction costs. 
Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such circumstances have an impact on 
social norms.  
 
                                                      
5 For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases see Carson and Mitchell (1995). 
  13IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The following micro level analysis uses data provided by the European Values Survey 
(EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political 
change. The survey collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout 
Europe. The EVS was first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to 1991 and again 
in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing number of countries participating over time. 
The methodological approach is explained in detail in the European Values Survey 
(1999) source book, which provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling 
procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of 
coding consistency, reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are 
conducted by experienced professional survey organizations, with the exception of 
Greece. Interviews are face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years 
and older. Tilburg University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to 
guarantee the use of standardized information in the surveys and the national 
representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in a 
prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country with an average 
response rate of around 60 percent.  
Because EVS poses an identical set of questions to individuals in various 
European countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine our 
hypotheses. We are able to employ a large data set considering 32 representative national 
samples. EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing the danger 
of framing effects when compared with many other surveys that focus entirely on 
  14environmental questions. A further advantage of using this extensive data set is the ability 
to explore a large number of dependent variables.  
In the macro analysis we not only explore the EVS but also the World Values 
Survey (WVS) using the same wave. EVS can be seen as a subpart of the WVS, although 
one should note that the questions are not always fully identical. For example, in the 
empirical micro analysis we are also going to use .data that has not been collected in the 
WVS.  
Economists are increasingly using survey data in areas of research such as those 
dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance. These literatures 
explore the causes of attitudes (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer and 
Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and 
Torgler, 2008). 
   In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with information such 
as our two dependent variables that measure participation in environmental organizations. 
We calculate the marginal effects to measure the quantitative effect of a variable, because 
the equation is nonlinear. Marginal effects indicate the change in the probability of 
individuals having a specific level of environmental preferences when the independent 
variable increases by one unit. Weighted estimates are conducted to ensure that the 
samples correspond to the national distribution.
6 Furthermore, answers such as ‘don’t 
know’ are eliminated in all estimations, as are any missing values. 
Table 1 presents the findings regarding membership in an environmental 
organization. In the first three specifications we explore our key environmental 
motivation variables m separately and the fourth includes all the three variables in the 
                                                      
6 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.  
  15specification. The results from the first three specifications indicate that all the m proxies 
are statistically significant. The first two have a positive impact, and the third has a 
negative impact. Thus, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. A higher level of environmental 
motivation due to higher moral standards induces voluntary involvement in 
environmental organizations. The negative coefficient in specification (3) is consistent 
with our prediction as it measures individuals’ interest in free-riding. A higher 
willingness to free-ride is negatively correlated with environmental engagement. The 
variable WILLINGESS TO GIVE INCOME has the strongest effect. An increase in the 
scale by one unit raises the probability of participating in an environmental organization 
by 2.5 percentage points.  The importance of this variable is also visible once you include 
all three variables in the regression. The coefficient is still statistically significant at the 
1% level with a marginal effect of 1.9 percentage points. On the other hand, the 
coefficient for the variable WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES is only statistically 
significant at the 10% level, and also shows a decrease in the marginal effects. Overall, 
these first results indicate that environmental motivation matters.  
Looking at the control variables we can see that women are more likely to be 
members of environmental organizations. Age is also positively correlated with being a 
member. Overall, the age group AGE 50-59 shows the strongest level of environmental 
participation (largest marginal effects). Having a child is negatively correlated with 
environmental participation, possibly because time restrictions may act as a barrier to 
being involved in environmental organizations. Education and political interest, measured 
as political discussion, have a positive impact on the probability of being a member in an 
environmental organization. The time restriction argument may also be invoked when 
  16focusing on the marital status. Those who have never before been married, and those who 
are separated exhibit the highest probability of participating in environmental 
organizations. Moreover, when taking employment status into account, we observe that 
part time employees are more likely to be members. There is also the tendency for self-
employed individuals to be more active in environmental organizations, probably because 
of the opportunity to improve their networks. On the other hand, the time restriction 
argument fails when it comes to the unemployed and retired, as they are less likely to be 
members than are full-time employees. Finally, we also observe that people in Western 
Europe are more likely to engage with environmental organizations through membership. 
The marginal effects are quite large (more than 4 percentage points).  
 In  Table 2 we explore a second aspect, namely doing unpaid work for 
environmental organizations. The results are quite similar. All the proxies for m in 
specification (5) to (7) are statistically significant. The strongest effects are again 
observable for the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME.  However, it should be 
noted that compared to Table 1 we find lower quantitative effects. Specification (8) also 
shows that the coefficient for the variable CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS is no longer 
statistically significant.   
  Looking at the control variables we find that contrary to the results on 
membership, there is now a negative correlation between environmental participation and 
being a woman. Thus, women are more likely to be a member in an environmental 
organization, but are less likely to do unpaid work. However, it can be argued that 
women might be more active in community-based and neighborhood organizations which 
address local environmental issues, while men are more likely to participate in formal 
  17environmental organizations. Our survey question captures more of the latter than the 
former – for this reason, our results may not actually conflict with findings to the 
contrary. Moreover, it should be noted that women (particularly younger women) would 
face other restrictions on their ability to participate in voluntary organizations, as they are 
often more heavily involved in time intensive household activities. 
  The age effect is now less visible, but we still observe that the AGE group 50-59 
has the strongest probability of doing unpaid work and that both education and political 
interest have a significant and positive impact on environmental engagement. Moreover, 
we also observe that the “never married” individuals are the most active in environmental 
organizations. On the other hand, the parental effect is now less obvious and it appears 
that only retired people are significantly less willing than the full time-employed 
individuals to be active in environmental organizations through unpaid work. Finally we 
again observe that Western European citizens are more likely to be environmentally 
engaged. However, the effect is not as strong as for membership and the coefficient is no 
longer statistically significant in all specifications.  
  In the next two tables we extend the previous regression by including individuals’ 
economic situation with two dummy variables. It should be noted that the number of 
observations in Table 3 and 4 strongly decreased after controlling for individuals’ 
economic situation. The results indicate that a higher level of economic status leads to a 
higher probability of being a member and doing unpaid work in environmental 
organizations. It seems that wealthier citizens have a higher demand for a clean 
environment and less environmental damages and thus a stronger incentive to actively 
contribute to the environment by participating in a voluntary organization. Thus, such a 
  18result is not consistent with our Eq. (9). However, it should be noted that the economic 
situation variable may not only cover the current wage but also the accumulated wealth 
over time. Nevertheless, we observe that the results obtained previously remain robust.  
Table 5 explores the potential endogeneity problems. One can argue that being 
involved in an environmental organization enhances pro-social environmental attitudes. 
To control for such a problem, we will use an instrumental approach to check the 
robustness of the results. A suitable instrument must be contemporaneously uncorrelated 
with the error term but must be highly correlated with membership in a voluntary 
environmental organization. Our instrument (an index of perceived level of social non-
compliance with well-known social rules
7) satisfies these conditions.  
For simplicity, we only report the results on membership involvement in Table 5. 
In previous studies we have seen that the perceived level of compliance affects 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation to contribute and cooperate (Frey and Torgler 2008, 
Torgler, Frey and Wilson 2008, Dong, Dulleck and Torgler 2008). The extent to which 
others comply with social rules systematically influences the individual willingness and 
motivation to contribute. Additionally, Owen and Videras (2006) found a positive and 
significant relationship between civic cooperation and/or allowing free-ride behaviors and 
environmental attitudes and intentions. They concluded that civic cooperation was a key 
factor to improving pro-environmental attitudes, especially in low income countries.  
                                                      
7Aggregated index of the following questions: According to you, how many of your compatriots do the 
following: Claming state benefits to which they are not entitled; Driving under the influence of alcohol; 
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas (each scale from 4=almost all to 1=almost none).  
 
  19The table reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations 
together with the first stage regressions. The results indicate that attitudes have a strong 
and significant impact on environmental involvement. In addition, Table 5 also shows 
that the instruments and the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage 
regression are statistically significant. There is a negative correlation between our 
environmental motivation variables and the perceived level of dishonest behavior. We 
also report the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of the 
instruments, checking the relevance of the excluded instruments. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant (see 
Hall et al., 1996). Moreover, we show results of the Anderson-Rubin test indicating that 
the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. Table 5 reports that in all 
cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis, 
which indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The 
Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant and has the advantage of being robust 
to the presence of weak instruments. 
  Finally, we test in Table 6 and 7 whether the impact of environmental motivation 
on environmental involvement is driven by a subset of countries and present the results 
for the coefficients for environmental attitudes in both tables using the specifications in 
the first two tables (without controlling for the economic situation). Each table is a 
summary of 96 regressions conducted within 32 countries. Table 6 focuses on 
membership participation, while Table 7 explores unpaid work as a dependent variable. 
In general we observe differences between the countries. Table 6 shows that the 
coefficient of the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is statistically significant 
  20in 25 out of 32 cases, and the strongest effect is observed for the Netherlands. An 
increase in the WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME by one unit increases the probability 
of being a member in an environmental organization by almost 10 percentage points. A 
strong quantitative effect is also observed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece, 
however the effects are generally lower among Eastern European countries. We find a 
similar result for the variable WILLIGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES. The coefficient is 
statistically significant in 24 out 32 cases. The strongest effect can also be found in the 
Netherlands (9.1 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.4 percentage points) and 
Greece (3.4 percentage points). The results are less strong when focusing on willingness 
to free-ride. However, here we also observe the strongest negative impact for the 
Netherlands (8.9 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.2 percentage points) and 
Belgium (4.2 percentage points).  Looking at Table 7 and therefore at unpaid work we 
find that the relationship is less strong when using unpaid work instead of membership 
participation as a dependent variable. Thus, environmental motivation helps to 
substantially increase the number of memberships, but is less strong when individuals are 
required to do unpaid work for environmental organizations. The coefficient for the 
variable WILLIGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is now only statistically significant in 18 out 
32 regressions. The quantitative effects are also substantially smaller. Greece reports the 
strongest effect with a marginal effect of 3.5 percentage points. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the same picture can be found for the other two motivational questions.  
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Table 1: Determinants of Being A Member in Environmental Organizations 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.   
Environmental Motivation (m)                             
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE 
INCOME 
0.313*** 19.07  0.025                0.250*** 11.97  0.019 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.223*** 14.81 0.019         0.032* 1.70 0.002 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.246*** -17.43 -0.020  -0.177*** -11.79  -0.014 
Gender                      
FEMALE    0.054**  1.97 0.004 0.067** 2.47 0.006 0.059** 2.15 0.005 0.056** 1.99  0.004 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.056  1.22 0.004 0.048  1.07 0.004 0.065  1.44 0.005 0.056  1.19  0.004 
AGE  40-49  0.115**  2.38 0.010 0.087*  1.82 0.008 0.110** 2.28 0.010 0.112** 2.25  0.009 
AGE  50-59  0.237***  4.65 0.022 0.216***  4.31 0.021 0.251***  4.93 0.024 0.243***  4.62  0.022 
AGE  60-69  0.189***  2.97 0.017 0.175***  2.77 0.016 0.212***  3.32 0.020 0.198***  3.02  0.018 
AGE  70+  0.238***  3.23 0.022 0.198***  2.68 0.019 0.213***  2.89 0.020 0.227***  2.96  0.021 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD  -0.104* -1.90 -0.008 -0.120** -2.19 -0.009 -0.117** -2.15 -0.009 -0.108* -1.91 -0.008 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION  0.025***  12.02 0.002  0.025*** 12.40 0.002  0.025*** 12.18 0.002  0.022*** 10.24  0.002 
POLITICAL  DISCUSSION  0.142***  7.01 0.011 0.151***  7.53 0.013 0.134***  6.64 0.011 0.114***  5.45  0.009 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  -0.103* -1.69 -0.007 -0.159***  -2.60 -0.012 -0.143** -2.37 -0.011 -0.133** -2.08  -0.009 
DIVORCED  -0.062  -1.25 -0.005 -0.065  -1.31 -0.005 -0.072  -1.44 -0.006 -0.062  -1.20  -0.005 
SEPARATED  0.010  0.10 0.001 0.001  0.01 0.000 0.030  0.31 0.002 0.040  0.39  0.003 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.123***  3.24 0.010 0.121***  3.24 0.011 0.135***  3.58 0.012 0.128***  3.29  0.011 
Employment Status                      
PART  TIME  EMPLOYEE  0.141***  3.09 0.012 0.159***  3.54 0.015 0.158***  3.45 0.015 0.151***  3.22  0.013 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.085  1.63 0.007 0.087*  1.67 0.008 0.086  1.63 0.008 0.096*  1.81  0.008 
UNEMPLOYED -0.099**  -1.97  -0.007  -0.091** -1.82 -0.007 -0.076  -1.51 -0.006 -0.068  -1.32  -0.005 AT  HOME  -0.114**  -2.19 -0.008 -0.105** -2.06 -0.008 -0.087*  -1.69 -0.007 -0.094*  -1.76  -0.007 
STUDENT -0.041  -0.66  -0.003  -0.007 -0.12  -0.001  -0.037 -0.60 -0.003 -0.061  -0.96  -0.005 
RETIRED  -0.252***  -3.96 -0.016 -0.227***  -3.61 -0.016 -0.206***  -3.30 -0.014 -0.219***  -3.37  -0.014 
OTHER  0.138  1.48 0.012 0.170*  1.85 0.016 0.166*  1.80 0.016 0.151  1.59  0.013 
Region                      
WESTERN  EUROPE  0.595***  20.91 0.047  0.554*** 19.90 0.046  0.454  16.38 0.037  0.522*** 17.99  0.040 
Pseudo R2  0.101       0.086       0.093       0.114      
Number of observations  36086       36052       36237       34428      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Unpaid Work in Environmental Organizations 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT
   (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat. Marg.   
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.233*** 10.45  0.009                0.204*** 7.47  0.008 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.162*** 7.89  0.007         0.045* 1.83 0.002 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.091*** -4.83  -0.004  -0.028 -1.39  -0.001 
Gender                      
FEMALE   -0.100***  -2.79  -0.004  -0.085** -2.40 -0.004 -0.092** -2.61 -0.004 -0.094** -2.55  -0.004 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.017  0.30 0.001 0.018  0.31 0.001 0.029  0.52 0.001 0.019  0.33  0.001 
AGE  40-49  0.094  1.58 0.004 0.077  1.32 0.003 0.090  1.54 0.004 0.081  1.34  0.003 
AGE  50-59  0.126* 1.96 0.005 0.127** 2.02 0.006 0.141** 2.22 0.006 0.116*  1.77  0.005 
AGE  60-69  0.123  1.51 0.005 0.096  1.18 0.004 0.116  1.42 0.005 0.110  1.30  0.005 
AGE  70+  0.101  0.92 0.004 0.055  0.50 0.002 0.035  0.31 0.001 0.049  0.42  0.002 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD  -0.106  -1.22 -0.004 -0.115  -1.35 -0.004 -0.101  -1.19 -0.004 -0.082 -0.94  -0.003 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION  0.019***  7.13 0.001 0.020***  7.40 0.001 0.021***  7.90 0.001 0.019***  6.71  0.001 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.110***  3.98 0.004 0.119***  4.37 0.005 0.115***  4.28 0.005 0.099***  3.53  0.004 
Marital Status                      
WIDOWED  -0.023  -0.28 -0.001 -0.062  -0.74 -0.002 -0.060  -0.72 -0.002 -0.049  -0.56  -0.002 
DIVORCED  -0.100  -1.50 -0.004 -0.091  -1.40 -0.003 -0.102  -1.56 -0.004 -0.103  -1.53  -0.004 
SEPARATED  0.160  1.22 0.007 0.148  1.15 0.007 0.161  1.25 0.008 0.181  1.36  0.009 
NEVER  MARRIED 0.139***  2.92 0.006 0.138***  2.95 0.006 0.144***  3.07 0.007 0.144***  2.96  0.006 
  24Employment Status                      
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.064  0.99 0.003 0.071  1.13 0.003 0.080  1.28 0.004 0.065  0.99  0.003 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.036  -0.50  -0.001 -0.028  -0.39 -0.001 -0.041  -0.57 -0.002 -0.034  -0.46  -0.001 
UNEMPLOYED -0.114  -1.60  -0.004  -0.095 -1.35  -0.004  -0.103 -1.46 -0.004 -0.096  -1.31  -0.004 
AT  HOME  -0.163**  -2.13 -0.006 -0.137*  -1.85 -0.005 -0.140*  -1.88 -0.005 -0.161** -2.07  -0.005 
STUDENT  0.073  1.02 0.003 0.119*  1.69 0.005 0.100  1.43 0.005 0.068  0.94  0.003 
RETIRED  -0.310***  -3.79 -0.009 -0.310***  -3.82 -0.010 -0.317***  -3.90 -0.010 -0.299***  -3.59  -0.009 
OTHER  0.139  1.14 0.006 0.146  1.21 0.007 0.140  1.16 0.007 0.157  1.27  0.007 
Region                         
WESTERN  EUROPE  0.092***  2.69 0.004 0.069** 2.04 0.003 0.024  0.69 0.001 0.069*  1.93  0.003 
Pseudo R2  0.053       0.043       0.037       0.055      
Number of observations  36086       36052       36237       34428      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.295*** 12.87  0.023                0.264*** 9.15  0.020 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.196*** 9.44  0.016         0.008 0.31  0.001 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.205*** -10.37  -0.017  -0.141***  -6.77  -0.011 
Gender                     
FEMALE    0.083**  2.02 0.006 0.090** 2.22 0.007 0.084**  2.07 0.007 0.085** 2.03 0.007 
Age                     
AGE  30-39  -0.058  -0.88 -0.004 -0.055  -0.85 -0.004 -0.043  -0.66 -0.003 -0.059  -0.88 -0.004 
AGE  40-49  0.011  0.16 0.001 -0.014  -0.20  -0.001  0.002  0.03 0.000 0.013  0.19 0.001 
AGE  50-59  0.141*  1.93 0.012 0.120*  1.65 0.011 0.154**  2.09 0.014 0.148*  1.95 0.012 
AGE  60-69  0.000  0.00 0.000 0.002  0.02 0.000 0.033  0.37 0.003 0.012  0.13 0.001 
AGE  70+  -0.051  -0.45 -0.004 -0.102  -0.89 -0.008 -0.108  -0.93 -0.008 -0.099  -0.82 -0.007 
Parental Effect                     
CHILD  -0.044  -0.54 -0.003 -0.044  -0.54 -0.004 -0.039  -0.47 -0.003 -0.030 -0.35  -0.002 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                   
EDUCATION  0.026*** 7.54 0.002 0.026***  7.78 0.002 0.027***  7.95 0.002 0.024***  6.79 0.002 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.147*** 4.99 0.012 0.155***  5.29 0.013 0.138***  4.70 0.011 0.123***  4.06 0.009 
Economic Situation                     
UPPER  CLASS  0.142*** 2.65 0.012 0.163***  3.06 0.015 0.156***  2.89 0.014 0.125** 2.26 0.010 
MIDDLE  CLASS 0.087**  2.04 0.007 0.092** 2.19 0.008 0.083*  1.95 0.007 0.079*  1.79 0.006 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  -0.067  -0.75 -0.005 -0.122  -1.35 -0.009 -0.095  -1.06 -0.007 -0.104  -1.09 -0.007 
DIVORCED  -0.079  -1.06 -0.006 -0.094  -1.27 -0.007 -0.108  -1.43 -0.008 -0.088  -1.14 -0.006 
  26SEPARATED  0.015  0.10 0.001 0.016  0.11 0.001 0.050  0.36 0.004 0.048  0.33 0.004 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.001  0.01 0.000 0.002  0.04 0.000 0.017  0.29 0.001 0.013  0.23 0.001 
Employment Status                     
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.088  1.21 0.007 0.108  1.53 0.010 0.093  1.29 0.008 0.091  1.22 0.007 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.059  0.75 0.005 0.055  0.72 0.005 0.063  0.81 0.005 0.074  0.95 0.006 
UNEMPLOYED -0.029  -0.42  -0.002  -0.027 -0.38  -0.002  -0.017  -0.24 -0.001 -0.013  -0.18 -0.001 
AT  HOME  -0.176**  -2.40 -0.012 -0.158** -2.20 -0.012 -0.146**  -2.01 -0.011 -0.172** -2.27 -0.012 
STUDENT -0.108  -1.22  -0.008  -0.056 -0.65  -0.004  -0.105  -1.21 -0.008 -0.128  -1.42 -0.009 
RETIRED  -0.041  -0.50 -0.003 -0.028  -0.34 -0.002 -0.022  -0.27 -0.002 -0.036  -0.43 -0.003 
OTHER  0.092  0.64 0.008 0.093  0.65 0.008 0.101  0.71 0.009 0.116  0.79 0.010 
Region                     
WESTERN  EUROPE    0.355*** 8.06 0.026 0.301***  7.02 0.023 0.254***  5.93 0.019 0.334***  7.39 0.023 
Pseudo R2  0.070       0.066       0.070       0.094      
Number of 
observations 
18862       18887       18877       18155      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (13) (14)  (15)  (16) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.231*** 8.06 0.010                0.212*** 5.98  0.009 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.153*** 5.77  0.007         0.008 0.26  0.0003 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.138*** -5.44  -0.006  -0.084*** -3.18  -0.003 
Gender                     
FEMALE   -0.158***  -3.04  -0.007  -0.144*** -2.80  -0.006  -0.145***  -2.80 -0.006 -0.155***  -2.90 -0.006 
Age                     
AGE  30-39  0.011  0.14 0.000 0.009  0.11 0.000 0.027  0.34 0.001 0.015  0.18 0.001 
AGE  40-49  0.006  0.06 0.000 -0.007  -0.08  0.000 0.005  0.06 0.000 0.001  0.01 0.000 
AGE  50-59  0.099  1.09 0.004 0.088  0.99 0.004 0.111  1.23 0.005 0.089  0.95 0.004 
AGE  60-69  0.040  0.36 0.002 0.016  0.15 0.001 0.038  0.34 0.002 0.030  0.26 0.001 
AGE  70+  0.052  0.35 0.002 0.012  0.08 0.001 -0.030  -0.19  -0.001 -0.013  -0.08 -0.001 
Parental Effect                     
CHILD  -0.042  -0.35 -0.002 -0.039  -0.33 -0.002 -0.016  -0.14 -0.001 -0.005  -0.04 0.000 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                   
EDUCATION  0.022*** 5.43 0.001 0.023***  5.62 0.001 0.023***  5.68 0.001 0.021***  4.85 0.001 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.064*  1.68 0.003 0.066*  1.78 0.003 0.055  1.48 0.002 0.039  1.01 0.002 
Economic Situation                     
UPPER  CLASS  0.237*** 3.58 0.012 0.254***  3.91 0.014 0.255***  3.83 0.013 0.241***  3.54 0.012 
MIDDLE  CLASS  0.153*** 2.79 0.007 0.156***  2.88 0.007 0.161***  2.93 0.007 0.166***  2.95 0.007 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  0.029  0.25 0.001 -0.006  -0.05  0.000 0.011  0.09 0.000 -0.007  -0.06  0.000 
DIVORCED  -0.077  -0.85 -0.003 -0.085  -0.94 -0.003 -0.106  -1.16 -0.004 -0.095  -1.03 -0.004 
  28SEPARATED  0.082  0.45 0.004 0.075  0.42 0.004 0.102  0.56 0.005 0.104  0.55 0.005 
NEVER  MARRIED 0.052  0.76 0.002 0.056  0.83 0.003 0.071  1.02 0.003 0.069  0.99 0.003 
Employment Status                     
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.038  0.40 0.002 0.062  0.69 0.003 0.055  0.59 0.002 0.048  0.50 0.002 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.015  -0.16  -0.001 -0.010  -0.11 0.000  -0.024  -0.25 -0.001 -0.018  -0.19 -0.001 
UNEMPLOYED -0.071  -0.77  -0.003  -0.063 -0.69  -0.003  -0.054  -0.58 -0.002 -0.058  -0.61 -0.002 
AT  HOME  -0.160  -1.62 -0.006 -0.141  -1.48 -0.006 -0.144  -1.49 -0.006 -0.158  -1.57 -0.006 
STUDENT  0.002  0.02 0.000 0.024  0.23 0.001 0.007  0.07 0.000 0.000  0.00 0.000 
RETIRED  -0.209*  -1.90 -0.007 -0.203*  -1.87 -0.007 -0.204*  -1.86 -0.007 -0.199*  -1.76 -0.007 
OTHER  0.224  1.42 0.012 0.222  1.42 0.012 0.229  1.46 0.012 0.252  1.56 0.013 
Region                     
WESTERN  EUROPE    0.119**  2.32 0.005 0.087*  1.71 0.004 0.057  1.12 0.002 0.110** 2.07 0.004 
Pseudo R2  0.063       0.053       0.053       0.070      
Number of observations  18862       18887       18877       18155      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
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 WEIGHTED 2SLS  2SLS   (17)  FIRST 
STAGE 
REGRESSION 
   2SLS   (18)  FIRST 
STAGE 
REGRESSION 




   Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat. Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat.  t-Stat.  Coeff. 
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                    
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.353*** 3.61                  
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
       0.232*** 4.65          
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
             -0.267*** -4.29   
Gender                      
FEMALE   -0.019**  -2.09  0.075***  6.20  -0.005  -1.07 0.059***  4.92  0.001  0.16 -0.025**  -2.07 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.014*  1.78  -0.028 -1.51  0.010  1.53  -0.023 -1.23  0.016**  2.28  0.043**  2.17 
AGE 40-49  0.032***  3.28  -0.060***  -2.98  0.013**  1.97  -0.011  -0.55  0.017**  2.33  0.019  0.89 
AGE 50-59  0.048***  4.48  -0.065***  -2.95  0.031***  4.20  -0.029  -1.34  0.041***  4.89  0.055**  2.42 
AGE 60-69  0.044***  3.49  -0.060**  -2.17  0.030***  3.26  -0.035  -1.28  0.054***  4.58  0.119***  4.34 
AGE 70+  0.073***  3.86  -0.148***  -4.51  0.034***  3.12  -0.059*  -1.83  0.049***  3.85  0.109***  3.34 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD -0.008  -0.89  -0.002  -0.11  -0.014*  -1.92 0.018  0.86  -0.023***  -2.90  -0.050**  -2.34 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION -0.002  -1.40  0.017***  15.84  0.000  -0.39 0.017***  15.26  -0.001  -0.99  -0.018***  -15.62 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
-0.033** -2.27 0.143***  15.91  -0.013*  -1.76 0.131*** 14.66  -0.022**  -2.24  -0.148***  -16.42 
Marital Status                      
WIDOWED  0.024* 1.77 -0.093*** -3.92 0.004  0.47  -0.065*** -2.79 0.001  0.17  0.043*  1.89 
DIVORCED  0.024**  2.03 -0.079*** -3.50 0.013  1.61  -0.073*** -3.27 0.013  1.49  0.064***  2.92 
SEPARATED -0.004  -0.19  0.020 0.48  0.007  0.45  -0.014 -0.32  0.022  1.33  0.069 1.62 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.025***  3.25  -0.029* -1.65  0.022***  3.61  -0.032* -1.89  0.021***  3.27  0.021  1.16 
  30Employment Status                      
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.009  0.89  0.030 1.34  0.016*  1.96  0.019 0.87  0.014  1.62  -0.024  -1.03 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.013  -1.13 0.071***  3.10  0.001  0.09 0.045*  1.93  -0.006  -0.59  -0.062**  -2.52 
UNEMPLOYED 0.013 1.11  -0.074***  -3.24  0.002  0.27 -0.065***  -2.89  0.016  1.59  0.105***  4.67 
AT HOME  -0.009  -1.00  -0.001  -0.04  -0.001  -0.20 -0.038*  -1.75  0.016*  1.69 0.096***  4.32 
STUDENT -0.040***  -2.85  0.082***  2.97  -0.015  -1.55 0.032  1.15  -0.034***  -2.92  -0.092***  -3.16 
RETIRED  0.021  1.48 -0.114*** -4.86 0.005  0.66  -0.105*** -4.71 0.025** 2.05  0.163***  7.54 
OTHER  0.022  1.21  -0.004 -0.08  0.016  1.00  0.037  0.86  0.012  0.73  -0.049 -1.11 
Region                      
WESTERN EUROPE   0.111***  6.25  -0.177***  -15.69  0.073*** 11.40  -0.106***  -9.42  -0.024 -1.37  -0.271***  -23.66 




    -0.009*** -4.06     -0.014*** -6.20     0.012*** 5.30 
Test of excluded 
instruments 
    16.45***       38.50       28.10***  
Anderson canon. cor. 
LR statistic 
21.552***      47.697***      32.857***      
Anderson-Rubin test  43.86***           41.73***           40.040***          
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 







  31Table 6: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Membership Participation in Single Countries  
 96 REGRESSIONS  WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS    
VARIABLE:    WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME   WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES   CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS 
 (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS) 
COUNTRIES                      
Western European 
Countries 
                  
Germany    0.586*** 4.47 0.012  0.365*** 3.24  0.011  -0.244** -2.47  -0.008 
Austria    0.299*** 4.51 0.041  0.193*** 3.29  0.028  -0.175***  -3.03  -0.025 
Belgium   0.263***  5.36  0.046  0.159*** 3.33  0.029  -0.241*** -5.05  -0.042 
Great  Britain    1.119*** 3.51 0.001  0.887*** 4.51  0.003  -0.030  -0.14  -0.001 
Denmark    0.207*** 3.12 0.041  0.224*** 3.63  0.044  -0.234***  -3.56  -0.046 
Finland   0.402*** 3.60 0.027  0.259**  2.44  0.021  -0.187*  -1.90  -0.016 
France   0.269***  3.02  0.008  0.141*  1.74  0.005  -0.017  -0.20  -0.001 
Iceland    0.161 1.29  0.013  0.291**  2.25  0.022 -0.077  -0.65  -0.006 
Ireland    0.316*  1.88  0.007  0.102 0.79  0.002 -0.116  -1.02  -0.003 
Italy    0.422*** 4.15 0.022  0.273*** 3.64  0.017  -0.267***  -3.89  -0.016 
Luxembourg 0.211***  3.06  0.035 0.137**  2.11 0.023 -0.116*  -1.88  -0.019 
Malta   0.060  0.56  0.003  -0.078  0.66 -0.004 -0.023 -0.20  -0.001 
Netherlands  0.240*** 4.03 0.095  0.232*** 4.06  0.091  -0.227***  -3.34  -0.089 
North  Ireland  0.538*** 2.65 0.021  0.692*** 3.17  0.018  -0.075  -0.50  -0.004 
Portugal  2.473***  4.22  0.000  0.095 0.39  0.000 0.148 0.72  0.000 
Spain  0.481*** 3.77 0.010  0.237** 2.14  0.006  -0.306**  -2.38  -0.007 
Sweden  0.237***  2.73  0.040  0.074 0.98  0.013 -0.133*  -1.86  -0.022 
Eastern European 
Countries 
                  
Belarus  0.229 1.39  0.005  0.335***  2.38  0.007 -0.109  -0.84  -0.003 
Bulgaria  0.633*** 3.86 0.009 0.437***  2.83 0.008  -0.190 -1.34  -0.005 
Croatia 0.146  1.10  0.004  -0.006  -0.03 0.000  -0.122  -0.91  -0.004 
Czech Republic  0.234***  2.79  0.028  0.141** 2.07  0.017  -0.107* -1.66  -0.013 
Estonia 0.608***  3.89  0.015  0.312*  1.78  0.011  -0.216  -1.65  -0.008 
  32Greece 0.309***  3.94  0.049 0.225***  3.35 0.037 -0.044  -0.70  -0.007 
Hungary  0.435*** 3.17 0.010  0.360*** 2.98  0.011  -0.274***  -3.28  -0.010 
Latvia  0.312*  1.74 0.001  0.427*** 2.65  0.010  -0.502** -1.97 -0.010 
Lithuania  1.078*** 4.08 0.002  0.520*** 3.13  0.007  -0.254  -1.21  -0.003 
Poland  0.312** 2.15  0.004  0.362** 2.06  0.004  -0.048  -0.39  -0.001 
Romania  -0.116  -0.82  -0.003  0.032 0.21  0.001 0.216 1.37  0.010 
Russia  0.422***  3.99  0.005  0.135 0.91  0.002 0.307**  2.34  0.004 
Slovak Republic   0.365***  3.57  0.015  0.347***  3.95  0.016  -0.173**  -2.22  -0.009 
Slovenia  0.152 0.90  0.010  0.021 0.16  0.001 0.111 1.21  0.007 
Ukraine  0.120 0.62  0.001  0.386**  2.08  0.002 -0.167  -1.16  -0.001 
Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at  











  33Table 7: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Unpaid Work in Single Countries  
 96 REGRESSIONS  WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS    
VARIABLE:    WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME   WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES   CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS 
 (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS) 
COUNTRIES                      
Western European 
Countries 
                  
Germany    0.650*** 3.40 0.004  0.607*** 4.14  0.005 -0.330** -2.13 -0.005 
Austria   0.164*  1.71  0.007  0.044  0.52  0.002  -0.117  -1.56  -0.006 
Belgium    0.107*  1.68  0.006  0.073 1.13  0.004  0.006 0.08  0.000 
Great Britain   0.229**  2.11  0.024  0.110  1.04  0.012  -0.171*  -1.68  -0.017 
Denmark    0.193 1.61  0.007  0.058 0.60  0.002  -0.181  -1.52  -0.007 
Finland    0.198 1.07  0.007  0.254 1.40  0.007  -0.156  -1.27  -0.005 
France   0.226**  2.03  0.003  0.150  1.30  0.002  -0.085  -0.79  -0.001 
Iceland    0.339 1.35  0.009  0.328 1.56  0.009  0.019 0.12  0.001 
Ireland   -0.132  -0.65  0.000  -0.038  -0.21  0.000  0.154  0.77  0.000 
Italy    0.410*** 3.16 0.013  0.270*** 2.90  0.009 -0.352***  -3.94 -0.012 
Luxembourg 0.211**  2.10 0.016  0.099  1.01  0.008 -0.106  -1.18  -0.008 
Malta   0.193  1.22  0.011  -0.053  -0.37 -0.003  -0.014  -0.11  -0.001 
Netherlands  0.117 0.90  0.007  0.240*  1.84  0.013  0.154 1.06  0.009 
North Ireland  1.513**  2.34  0.000  0.576***  3.15  0.001  -0.263  -0.80  0.000 
Portugal  9.210 1.28  0.000  -0.382  -1.30  0.000  0.032 0.12  0.000 
Spain  1.141*** 3.76 0.001  0.391*** 3.01  0.004 -0.406** -2.40 -0.004 
Sweden 0.346**  2.13  0.013  0.178  1.37  0.007  -0.151  -1.60  -0.006 
Eastern European 
Countries 
                
Belarus  0.118 1.27  0.003  0.060 0.63  0.001  0.178**  2.04  0.005 
Bulgaria 0.479***  3.50  0.007  0.277**  2.01  0.005  -0.174  -1.25  -0.003 
Croatia 0.167  1.15  0.003  -0.063  -0.31 -0.001  -0.039  -0.26  -0.001 
Czech Republic  0.130  1.39  0.008  0.156* 1.72 0.009  -0.162*  -1.77  -0.009 
Estonia 0.746***  3.99  0.000  0.249  1.10  0.000  -0.288  -1.60  0.000 
  34Greece 0.226***  2.72  0.035  0.111  1.64 0.018  0.049 0.74  0.008 
Hungary 0.362***  3.42  0.011  0.211*  1.86  0.008  -0.137  -1.46  -0.005 
Latvia  0.009 0.06  0.000  0.008 0.07  0.000  0.226 0.23  0.001 
Lithuania  0.886*** 3.87 0.003  0.741*** 3.55  0.006 0.009  0.03 0.000 
Poland 1.010***  3.48  0.000  0.028  0.13  0.000  -0.367**  -2.40  0.000 
Romania  -0.127  -0.73  -0.001  0.076 0.50  0.001  0.318 1.12  0.003 
Russia  0.337*** 2.80 0.003  0.309*  1.85  0.004 0.189  1.19 0.003 
Slovak Republic   0.358***  2.63  0.013  0.341***  3.08  0.013  -0.197**  -2.29  -0.009 
Slovenia  0.126 0.71  0.008  0.016 0.12  0.001  0.007 0.07  0.070 
Ukraine 0.175  0.62  0.000  0.586***  2.84  0.000  -1.183***  -4.74  0.000 
Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at  
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VI. MACRO EXTENSION 
 
In a next step we are going to explore whether the previous results remain robust at 
the macro level. We therefore extend the number of countries to include those from 
the World Values Survey (see Appendix), and build averages out of the country 
values. However, we do not recode the original environmental motivation variables, 
which means that higher values are related to lower environmental motivation for the 
first two variables (willingness to give income and willingness to increase taxes). In 
other words, we measure the non-willingness to give income or increase taxes. We are 
going to use a simple OLS regression using the latest 2000 data.  
We report beta or standardized regression coefficients to reveal the relative 
importance of the variables employed. To obtain robust standard errors in these 
estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. We are 
also providing the elasticity of y with respect to x equivalent to   
evaluated at the multivariate point of means of the data. As control variables we are 
going to use a proxy for institutional quality, the growth rate, the level of urbanization 
and the population size AGE > 65. Institutional quality has been measured using the 
POLITICAL RISK RATING from the International Country Risk Guide. It is an 
index that measures government stability, internal and external conflicts, corruption, 
law and order, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality, ethnic and religious 
tensions, the military in politics and the socioeconomic and investment conditions. 
Higher values are correlated with better institutions. We also control for the level of 
economic development and urbanization. A higher level of urbanization may provide 






 a larger potential subject pool, but on the other hand it also increases the level of 
anonymity among individuals. It could be argued that this higher degree of anonymity 
would lead to higher transaction costs when forming a voluntary organization. We 
control for the age structure (in line with the micro analysis), as it is expected that the 
number of individuals who are actively involved in environmental organizations 
decreases as age increases. The intuition is that older people will not live to enjoy the 
benefits of preserving resources for later years. However, it can be argued that as 
people age, they become more cautious, more risk averse and more conservative or 
compliant (Torgler 2007), and they have more free time, so the correlation can also be 
positive.  Table 8 presents the results using both dependent variables. We again 
observe that environmental motivation is correlated with environmental participation, 
which is in line with the results of the micro level analysis. The coefficients for the 
two first proxies are always statistically significant, reporting relatively large beta 
coefficients next to the political factors.  Similarly, the calculated elasticities 
demonstrate that these two environmental motivation regressors are elastic, with a 
decrease in environmental motivation having more than four times as large an effect 
on environmental participation. However it should be noted that the coefficient on the 
third proxy is not statistically significant.  
  Looking at the control variables we observe that there is a positive relationship 
between institutional/governance quality proxied by POLITICAL RISK FACTOR 
and  participation in environmental organizations.. However, the factor is more 
relevant when analyzing membership participation. Looking at the other variables we 
observe a negative relationship between urbanization and environmental participation, 













Table 8: Macro Evidence 
Dep Variable  Membership  Unpaid Work 
Environmental Motivation           
NON-WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME  -0.392***     -0.236*    
  -2.96    -1.84    
  -4.130    -2.657    
NON-WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES    -0.406***    -0.369***   
    -4.25    -3.16   
    -5.080    -4.950   
AGAINST CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS    0.258    0.058 
     0.93    0.27 
     2.069    0.498 
Political Factor        
POLITICAL  RISK  FACTOR  0.562**  0.501* 0.410* 0.228* 0.163  0.204 
  2.00 1.78 1.76 1.83 1.40 1.00 
  4.160 3.709 3.037 1.805 1.295 1.621 
Further Factors        
GDP  GROWTH  -0.111 -0.142 -0.050 0.155  0.112  0.188 
  -0.82 -1.08 -0.37 1.05  0.82  1.16 
  -0.198 -0.253 -0.089 0.297  0.214  0.358 
URBANIZATION  -0.042 -0.039 -0.129 -0.422 -0.390*  -0.478** 
  -0.21 -0.21 -0.61 -1.87* -1.91  -2.03 
  -0.166 -0.154 -0.512 -1.799 -1.662 -2.035 
POPULATION (AGE > 65)  -0.481*  -0.462 -0.425 -0.107 -0.071 -0.119 
  -1.67 -1.57 -1.46 -0.48 -0.32 -0.39 
  -1.436 -1.381 -1.269 -0.343 -0.226 -0.380 
REGIONS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Prob  >  F  0.004 0.000 0.024 0.056 0.010 0.074 
R
2  0.369 0.375 0.302 0.456 0.513 0.418 
#  of  observations  52 52 52 52 52 52 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors. Beta/standardized coefficients reported. t-values in bold and elasticities in italics. The symbols *,  
**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Regions: Dummies using the common  
differentiation (Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, the Pacific, Asia, the Caribbean and 
Australia). 
 
                                                      
8 It should be noted that the impact of economic growth does not when neglecting the political 
institutions in the regressions.   
Table 9: 2SLS Focusing on Membership Participation 
Dep. Variable: Membership    

















Environmental Motivation        
NON-WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME  -0.310*       
   -1.95        
NON-WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE 
TAXES 
  -0.262**     
     -2.17     
AGAINST CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS      0.280*  
        1.67   
Political Factor         
POLITICAL RISK FACTOR  0.003**  0.0003  0.002*  -0.001  -0.002  0.015 
   2.15 0.08 1.81 -0.38  -0.45  2.92 
Further Factors        
GDP GROWTH  -0.005  -0.014  -0.006 -0.019 -0.0002  -0.003 
   -1.15 -1.00 -1.38 -1.47 -0.03 -0.19 
URBANIZATION  0.0003 0.004  0.0002 0.004  -0.0004  -0.002 
   0.33 1.36 0.24 1.60 -0.37  -0.56 
POPULATION (AGE > 65)  -0.004  0.007  -0.005  0.005  0.0003  -0.023 
   -0.81 0.43  -1.14 0.31  0.03  -1.24 
REGIONS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Instrument:        
CHILD QUALITIES: TOLERANCE   -0.836*   -0.990**    0.924* 
AND RESPECT FOR OTHER PEOPLE    -1.92   -2.47   1.78 
Test of excluded     3.67*   6.09**    3.16* 
instruments        
Identification/IV relevance test:        
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic  4.479**    7.232***    3.881**   
Weak identification statistics:        
Anderson-Rubin test   4.26**    4.26**    4.26**   
Notes: t-values in  italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Regions: Dummies using the common differentiation (Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan  







Table 10: 2SLS Focusing on Unpaid Work 
Dep. Variable: Unpaid Work    

















Environmental Motivation        
NON-WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME  -0.187*            
   -1.73         
NON-WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE 
TAXES 
  -0.158**       
     -2.11       
AGAINST CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS      0.169  
       1.46   
Political Factor         
POLITICAL RISK FACTOR  0.001  0.0003  0.0003  -0.001  -0.002  0.015*** 
   0.64 0.08 0.34 -0.38  -0.87  2.92 
Further Factors        
GDP  GROWTH  0.001 -0.014  0.001 -0.019  0.004 -0.003 
   0.30 -1.00  0.22 -1.47  1.19 -0.19 
URBANIZATION  -0.001  0.004 -0.001*  0.004 -0.001*  -0.002 
   -1.26 1.36  -1.70 1.60  -1.77 -0.56 
POPULATION (AGE > 65)  0.001  0.007  0.0005  0.005  0.004  -0.023 
   0.29 0.43 0.18 0.31 0.71 -1.24 
REGIONS  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Instrument:        
CHILD QUALITIES: TOLERANCE   -0.836*   -0.990**    0.924* 
AND RESPECT FOR OTHER PEOPLE    -1.92   -2.47   1.78 
Test of excluded     3.67*   6.09**    3.16* 
instruments        
Identification/IV relevance test:        
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic  4.479**    7.232***    3.881**   
Weak identification statistics:        
Anderson-Rubin test   3.71*     3.71*     3.71*   
Notes: t-values in  italics. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Regions: Dummies using the common differentiation (Europe, Latin America, North America, North Africa, Sub Saharan  
Africa, the Pacific, Asia, the Caribbean and Australia). 
 
 
In line with the micro estimations we also present 2SLS regressions. It should 
be noted that we are not able to use the previous instrument as it would substantially 
reduce the number of observations. We therefore use an alternative instrument, 









9. It measures the individuals’ willingness to educate their children on social 
norms.  Thus, we would predict a statistically significant correlation between our 
environmental motivational variables and such a variable. Additionally, tolerance and 
other related attitudes are features of affective education clearly linked to cooperation 
and interaction among people lead which generate children’s abilities related to social 
capital issues (Nixon et al, 1996). This relationship is confirmed when looking at the 
first stage regressions in Table 9 and 10. We also conduct the Anderson’s likelihood-
ratio test. A failure to reject the null hypothesis would call the identification status of 
the estimated equation into question. Table 9 and 10 show that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that our specified instrument is redundant. In general, the results obtained 
in the six 2SLS estimations indicate that our previous findings on the key hypothesis 
remain robust. We observe a relatively robust relationship between environmental 




This paper investigates whether environmental motivation affects environmental 
behavior. We therefore first present a model that explores the relationship between 
environmental motivation and volunteering, and then test empirically the hypothesis 
generated by that theoretical model. Behavioral engagement was proxied through the 
reported participation in environmental organizations.  We focused on two aspects of 
participation, namely being a member and doing unpaid work for environmental 
organizations. We also use three different proxies for environmental motivation, two 
                                                      
9 Question: Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, 
do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five. (CODE FIVE ONLY). Tolerance 
and respect for other people (0 = Not mentioned, 1=Important).   
 of which measure pro-environmental attitudes, namely the willingness to give part of 
the own income to prevent environmental pollution, and whether the respondent 
would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent 
environmental pollution. In addition, we have explored a variable that measures 
people’s incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). The motivation behind 
such a study is the observation that deterrence models fail to predict the relatively 
high level of compliance in various situations where a private cost is incurred in order 
to provide a public good.  Previous literature on this paradox covers situations such as 
tax compliance despite the low chance of being audited and not littering despite the 
low probability of getting caught and penalized. This paper provides empirical 
support for the idea that environmental motivation indeed affects individuals’ 
voluntary involvement in environmental organizations. By using a large micro-data 
set covering not less than 32 different countries we are able to provide a 
comprehensive summary for every single country (almost 200 regressions). In 
addition, we check the robustness of the results using a macro approach, and here we 
extend the number of countries by including data from the World Values Survey. In 
addition, we have explored potential endogeneity problems. The results show robust 
findings and therefore indicate that attitudinal questions help to explain behavioral 
consequences. Environmental motivation, environmental morale or pro-environmental 
attitudes are highly relevant to an understanding of why people have a higher 
willingness to be involved in environmental protection. However, it should be noted 
that these social norms work more strongly towards membership of an environmental 
organization rather than doing unpaid work in these groups. Unpaid work is 




42The results of our analyses present an insight into voluntary participation and whose 
preferences are being served by voluntary provision of a public environmental good. 
Considering the difficulty and expense involved in regulating to protect the 
environment, (and the political sensitivity of such actions), policymakers seeking the 
most effective ways to address the consequences of climate change and ecological 
degradation could find efficient solutions through crowding-in these motivations. 
These empirical findings are not only useful in the context of environmental 
issues, but can also be applied to voluntary participation and provision of public 
goods more generally. Ostrom (2000, 154) claims that the (pre-Mancur Olson) idea of 
collective action arising organically from groups in order to solve their own dilemmas 
was “not entirely misguided”, and maintains that institutional, cultural and 
biophysical contexts may play a role in determining which individuals join collective 
action groups.  Ostrom also raises the uncomfortable point that past policy based on 
payoff structures appealing to the rational egoists could have been misdirected.  In 
fact, this could have worked against the original intention of the policy, crowding out 
social norms that encourage cooperative behavior rather than encouraging collective 
action (Ostrom 2000, 154).  
With respect to environmental issues, by focusing on willingness to pay for 
environmental quality, past policy may have placed an inappropriate emphasis on 
financial values for the environment. Moreover, as pro-social behavior is both 
voluntary and conditioned by observed norms of behavior in society, there exists a 
stronger chance to crowd in these behaviors than to persist in seeking the appropriate 
monetary value for the environment based on an individually stated willingness to 
incur private costs in order to supply a public good.  In seeking policy implications 




43community based organizations and partnerships with existing organizations. A 
partnership that matches community effort could increase the warm glow ‘g’ for the 
purely egoistic contributor while also increasing the ‘G’ for the purely altruistic 
contributor. If policies cease to be aimed at the rational egoist and instead are aimed at 
crowding in existing motivations and pro-social behaviors, environmental quality may 
be ensured at lower transaction and policing costs. Finally, it should be noted that 
further investigations are required to gain a better understanding of what shapes 
individuals’ environmental motivation. This would provide a better foundation to 
derive policy implications to promote, encourage and maintain a higher willingness to 







Description of control variables 
Variable Definitions 
Micro Analysis 
AGE  AGE 30-39, AGE40-49, AGE 50-59, AGE 60-69, AGE +70 (AGE -30 in the 
reference group,) 
GENDER  WOMAN (MAN in the reference group) 
PARENT EFFECT  CHILD (not having children in the reference group) 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
EDUCATION 
EDUCATION:  
What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
1.  No formal education 
2.  Incomplete primary school 
3.  Completed primary school  
4.  Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5.  Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6.  Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7.  Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8.  Some university-level education, without degree 
9.  University-level education, with degree 
 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION:  
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters? 
1.   Never   
2.   Occasionally 
3.   Frequently 
MARITAL STATUS  WIDOWED; DIVORCED; SEPARATED; NEVER MARRIED (MARRIED in 
the reference group) 
ECONOMIC SITUATION  People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the 
middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: 
UPPER CLASS, MIDDLE CLASS (the rest, WORKING CLASS and LOWER 
CLASS, in the reference group). 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS  PART-TIME EMPLOYEE, SELFEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, AT HOME, 




POLITICAL RISK FACTOR  ICRG  index  covering  12 factors (government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, 
military in politics, religious tension, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucracy). For a detailed description see:   
http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods#Background_of_the_I
CRG_Rating_System. 
GDP GROWTH  GDP per capita growth (annual %).  Source: World Development Indicators. 
URBANIZATION  Urban population (% of total). Source: World Development Indicators. 












Table A2: Descriptive Statistics Micro Analysis  
 
Variables Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Key  variables         
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES (INCOME)  38877  1.620  0.885  0  3 
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTIDUES (TAXES)  38834  1.412  0.877  0  3 
ENVIRONMENTAL FREE-RIDING  39038  1.996  0.894  0  3 
MEMBER VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION  41125  0.049  0.216  0  1 
WORKING VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION  41125  0.020  0.140  0  1 
         
Control Variables         
AGE 30-39  40963 0.197  0.398  0  1 
AGE 40-49  40963 0.191  0.393  0  1 
AGE 50-59  40963 0.15  0.357  0  1 
AGE 60-69  40963 0.135  0.342  0  1 
AGE 70+  40963 0.102  0.302  0  1 
WOMAN  41114 0.54  0.498  0  1 
CHILDREN  41125 0.077  0.266  0  1 
EDUCATION 39840  18.712  5.125  5  74 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  40713 1.886  0.654  1  3 
UPPER CLASS  21335  0.136  0.343  0  1 
MIDDLE CLASS  21335  0.338  0.473  0  1 
WIDOWED  39861 0.097  0.295  0  1 
DIVORCED  39861 0.07  0.256  0  1 
SEPARATED  39861 0.016  0.124  0  1 
NEVER MARRIED  39861 0.228  0.42  0  1 
PART TIME EMPLOYED  40919 0.068  0.252  0  1 
SELFEMPLOYED  40919 0.052  0.222  0  1 
UNEMPLOYED  40919 0.229  0.42  0  1 
AT HOME  40919 0.095  0.293  0  1 
STUDENT  40919 0.061  0.24  0  1 
RETIRED  40919 0.073  0.261  0  1 
OTHER  40919 0.018  0.131  0  1 
         
Instrument         
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics Macro Analysis  
 
  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  
MEMBERSHIP  60  0.057 0.070 0.002 0.451 
UNPAID  WORK  58  0.039 0.051 0.002 0.277 
NON-WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME  57  2.248 0.270 1.583 3.052 
NON-WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES  57  2.039 0.307 1.380 2.806 
AGAINST CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS  57  2.472 0.253 1.866 3.135 
POLITICAL  RISK  FACTOR  140  66.383 13.970 31.083 95.250 
GDP GROWTH  186  2.507  4.396  -16.580  18.940 
URBANIZATION  206  54.783 24.734 8.60  100 
POPULATION (AGE > 65)  188  6.888  4.581  1.08  18.21 
       
Instrument:       
CHILD QUALITIES: TOLERANCE   68  0.705 0.0964  0.525 0.923 
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